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5.1  Introduction 
The early 1980s have witnessed a dramatic increase in man- 
agement buyouts of public companies. In these transactions 
a team of investors including the managers borrow the money 
and buy the shares of the firm’s public shareholders. Equity 
in the private company emerging from this transaction is owned 
by managers, investment bankers, institutional investors such 
as  insurance  companies,  and  sometimes  Employee  Stock 
Ownership Plans (ESOPs). But equity constitutes only a small 
fraction of  capitalization:  debt-equity ratios typically  range 
from 6:l to 12:l (hence the term leveraged buyout). A man- 
agement buyout (MBO) is a particular type of leveraged buy- 
out in which management participates in a buyout of share- 
holders  of  a  public  corporation,  as  opposed  to a  private 
company or a division of a public or private company. 
When an MBO takes place, shareholders earn a 50 percent 
premium on average and managers often take money out and 
still end up with larger equity  stakes (in dollar terms) than 
they  previously  held.  The  sponsoring  investment  bankers 
pocket high fees and commonly realize 50 percent annual re- 
turns over five to seven years on their equity investment in 
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the new firm. With everyone doing so well, it is not surprising 
that management buyouts have grown. 
And grow they have. While the first $100 million transaction 
did not occur until 1979, transactions in the hundreds of mil- 
lions of dollars became common shortly after that, culminating 
in the $5.4  billion buyout of Beatrice Foods in 1985. The total 
dollar volume of transactions has increased from $1 billion in 
1980 to $10 billion in the first six months of 1984 and is certain 
to be higher now. It is clear that the management buyout today 
is  a relevant  option for all  but  the  very  largest  American 
corporations. 
The amount of money changing hands in MBOs-whether 
going to shareholders, to managers, or to investment bank- 
ers-has  promoted both curiosity and concern. Why are MBOs 
happening now, and in such large volume? What are the sources 
of gains that account for 50 percent or, in the case of MBOs 
in which several bidders are involved, 70 percent premia? Is 
it true value creation, or just value transferred from the old 
shareholders and the taxman? If  it is value  transfer, is the 
government footing the bill  or are the  selling  shareholders 
getting ripped off? If, in contrast, value is created through 
cost-cutting and more responsible capital budgeting, why do 
we need MBOs to get this accomplished? 
In this paper we attempt to describe and interpret what has 
been happening recently in a way that addresses these com- 
mon questions and concerns. While data on private firms are 
hard to come by, and the skimpy data that exist have not been 
completely analyzed, some insights are beginning to emerge 
from case studies. In a nutshell, our interpretation of the evi- 
dence runs as follows. Inflation, tax law changes, and inno- 
vations in the market for risky, unsecured debt in the early 
1980s have created new opportunities to increase value. Mar- 
ket values of many large corporations could be raised through 
recapitalizations, takeovers, and by other means. While some 
firms responded to the changing environment by voluntarily 
changing  their  operating strategies and financial structures, 
other firms faced  a hostile  takeover.  In response  to these 
threats, some management teams,  committed to the perpet- 
uation of their own control, undertook management buyouts. 
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to the market pressure to restructure and recapitalize. While 
management buyouts accommodate the financial pressures of 
the market, they also allow incumbent management to con- 
tinue running the business.  Interestingly, the viability of the 
MBO as a takeover defense has been bolstered by the same 
capital market  developments  and tax advantages that have 
increased the pressure coming from hostile takeovers. We  be- 
lieve that these facts are responsible for many of the MBOs 
of the 1980s. 
In the rest of the paper we develop this argument in greater 
detail. In section 5.2, we review the changes of the late 1970s 
and early  1980s and try to document the experience in the 
market for corporate control that we believe is a response to 
an excessively slow adjustment to changes in the environment. 
We  show how that environment put pressures on firms and in 
many cases led to challenges to the control of incumbent man- 
agement. Management buyouts have enabled management to 
defeat many  of  these challenges while  still dealing directly 
with the problems that sparked the challenge. We also attempt 
to summarize the evidence on the question of the source of 
MBO gains, since tax savings, deviation of market prices from 
fundamental values, and efficiency gains all seem plausible. 
In  section 5.3, we recapitulate  our view  of  the MBO as a 
defensive response to market pressures  and we discuss its 
consequences for economic efficiency. 
5.2  An Explanation of Management Buyouts 
5.2.1 
The structural changes in the American economy in the late 
1970s and early 1980s have increased the ease and profitability 
of acquiring old corporate assets. This has precipitated many 
forms of  corporate control transactions, among them man- 
agement buyouts. 
One of the most important shocks hitting the economy in 
that period was inflation. As amply documented by Feldstein 
(1983), it had significant effects on the value and the deploy- 
ment of corporate assets. First, inflation raised the nominal 
value of corporate assets above their historical cost. This cre- 
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ated the opportunity to buy used assets and to depreciate them 
from scratch with a large step-up in basis. Such “churning” 
transactions became all the more attractive with the Economic 
Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) of  1981, which allowed for accel- 
erated depreciation of newly purchased old assets as well as 
completely new assets (see Gordon, Hines, and Summers 1986). 
With only a small depreciation recapture and a large step-up 
in basis, churning used assets became an attractive option. 
These transactions are especially advantageous from the tax 
viewpoint if  the company selling assets is liquidated. Under 
the General Utilities doctrine (repealed in the 1986  tax reform), 
asset sales accompanied by liquidation are free from capital 
gains taxes at the corporate level. Thus, if  a seller of assets 
survives as a corporate entity, it must pay taxes on capital 
gains realized from this sale, whereas if  this seller liquidates 
in the process, such taxes are avoided. Not surprisingly, this 
provision has encouraged the churning of whole companies. 
A second important consequence of inflation was the sub- 
stantial reduction  in  real  corporate debt obligations.  Since 
interest payments were not indexed, a few years of rapid in- 
flation substantially reduced the outstanding debt. This had 
two important effects. First, firms were ripe to lever up and 
take advantage of tax shields associated with the deductibility 
of interest payments. These interest tax shields may have also 
increased in value with the inflation-driven decline in depre- 
ciation tax shields. After several years of inflation, firms were 
clearly operating below their debt capacities. Second, the free 
cash flows of many corporations that were not too adversely 
affected by the reduction in depreciation tax shields may have 
increased as their revenues kept up with inflation while interest 
payments did not. As pointed out by Jensen (1986), the ex- 
istence of  large free cash flows can lead to corporate waste 
and  self-interested capital  budgeting  decisions  by  manage- 
ment. While debt has the effect of encouraging managers to 
run a tight ship to meet their interest payments, the absence 
of debt gives them the freedom to waste money. By reducing 
real  corporate debt obligations, inflation may  have  created 
both the opportunity and the need to lever up. 
In addition to inflation,  two other changes bolstered  the 
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ing  opportunities,  especially through  the use  of  unsecured 
debt. Access to increasingly large pools of institutional funds 
through bank loans,  junk bonds, and other arrangements made 
borrowing possible  in  many cases where it would not  have 
been five years earlier. It is quite likely, of course, that the 
development of these markets was in part a response to the 
needs of corporate control transactions. 
Another tax  strategy that encouraged MBOs was the use 
of  Employee Stock Ownership Plans. The 1981  ERTA raised 
the capacity of  the ESOPs to borrow money from a bank, 
buy  the  firm’s  shares  and  then  deduct  both  interest  and 
principal payments on the loan.  Effectively, this enabled the 
firm itself to deduct the principal on its debt, as long as that 
debt  was  channeled  through  the  ESOP.  To  make  ESOPs 
even more attractive, Congress passed a bill in  1984 allow- 
ing banks to deduct half of their interest income from loans 
to an ESOP.  Some of this saving is undoubtedly passed on 
to the firm. 
Inflation, better capital markets, and tax laws of this period 
created substantial opportunities for corporate raiders or in- 
cumbent  managers to raise  shareholder wealth  through  re- 
structuring and recapitalization. Value gains could be realized 
by closing plants, curtailing diversification strategies, levering 
up, churning assets (especially whole companies), and bring- 
ing in ESOPs. Changes in the environment not only increased 
the pressure from hostile takeovers, but also made the man- 
agement buyout a more viable defensive option, since better 
borrowing opportunities and large tax gains subsidized these 
transactions. 
5.2.2  Management Response 
Many  companies  voluntarily  adopted  value-increasing 
changes. Depressed stock prices and tax gains were probably 
sufficient to motivate these firms. But levering up and elimi- 
nating slack is not a proposition that is costless to manage- 
ment. Life becomes more difficult as management faces the 
constant pressure of meeting debt payments, the high cost of 
financial distress, and the loss of control over free cash flows. 
Furthermore, a management initiating an MBO puts the firm 
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hostile takeover. As a result, many management teams have 
chosen not to increase leverage to value-maximizing levels. 
When hostile takeovers threatened the continuity of  their 
control, target managements responded with the MBO (among 
other defenses, such as greenmail, scorched earth, and poison 
pills).  Although  executed  under  pressure,  this  transaction 
nonetheless accomplishes two goals. On the one hand, the 
enterprise survives as an independent  entity under current 
management. On the other hand, tax and other benefits are 
realized, thus relieving the pressure for change. 
5.2.3 
The cases we have looked at largely support the proposition 
that MBOs are often a response to a hostile threat. We  focused 
on the set of companies that were part of the Fortune 500 in 
1980 and were acquired sometime between 1981 and 1984. We 
found that, of the eleven successful MBOs, six were responses 
to direct hostile threats, expressed either as actual tender of- 
fers or as acquisitions of  shares with an intent to influence 
corporate decisions. In the subsample of  seven failed MBO 
attempts, three were (unsuccessful) responses to the threat of 
a hostile takeover. At least for very large firms, the primary 
impetus behind the MBO is often not the prospect of making 
a large acquisition profit, but rather the threat that someone 
will do so at management’s expense. 
Perhaps it is evidence of the sweat and pressure following 
a successful MBO and of the risks of being outbid by a hostile 
raider that a significant number of  MBOs are initiated only 
after a hostile threat. The drawbacks to such a takeover must 
be significant from management’s point of view, for virtually 
every analysis of MBOs has found that value gains from these 
transactions are fairly large. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Rice 
(1984) find an average premium of  56 percent over the day 
earlier share price. Lowenstein (1985) in his sample of twenty- 
eight MBOs with purchase prices over $100 million also finds 
a 56 percent premium.  In our sample of  eleven successful 
management buyouts of Fortune 500 firms, we find an average 
premium over the day earlier market price of 53 percent. These 
results are consistent across samples, and are also similar to 
the findings for interfirm cash tender offers. 
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5.2.4  Sources of MBO Gains 
Given the large premia being paid  by  investment bankers 
and institutional investors in MBOs, there seems to be a strong 
presumption that there are either large value gains from the 
new financial and ownership structure or large gains based on 
hidden values in the pre-MBO company. The three sources of 
gains that  we  think  can plausibly  account for a  significant 
portion  of  the premium  are:  tax  savings, improvements in 
efficiency (which would include value-increasing liquidation), 
and pre-MBO underpricing of the firm’s equity relative to the 
old regime’s expected future cash flows. Because the relative 
significance of these three sources of gains has been widely 
debated, we will examine their importance in some detail be- 
low, and give a few examples.  First, however,  we need  to 
stress two important points that put these discussions of MBO 
gains in perspective. 
The existence of potential gains from acquiring and/or re- 
structuring the firm is what attracts a hostile bidder in the first 
place. It is therefore not surprising that these gains might be 
large; otherwise the hostilities might never have started. But 
the exact source of gains that has precipitated the hostile take- 
over is not necessarily the same as the source of gains from 
the defensive MBO. For example, a hostile takeover launched 
in order to force management to shut down unprofitable ca- 
pacity may be defeated by a higher offer from MBO organizers 
who plan to get a larger portion of their value gains from tax 
benefits of leverage. Conversely, even when the initial impetus 
behind the MBO is a hostile tender offer designed to realize 
gains from market underpricing or tax savings, we would ex- 
pect management to strive harder to cut costs and increase 
efficiency in  the highly levered and more closely held  new 
firm. Having paid a large premium, MBO organizers must find 
ways  to realize value  when  constrained to meet large debt 
payments. Competitive bidding in  the market for corporate 
control, and debt-equity ratios  that range from 6:  1 to 12:  1, 
mean that this constraint is likely to be binding. 
The other point is that the exact nature of the gains in an 
MBO bears little relation to whether or not the public share- 
holders have been coerced to sell. Whatever the source of 
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sense that the public shareholders could not completely share 
in the expected gains realized after  the MBO. The issue of 
coercion is thus different frorn that of MBO organizers buying 
underpriced  shares. The latter applies when  shares are ac- 
quired at a price below their fundamental value under the old 
regime. Coercion takes place when public shareholders would 
rather keep their current share of the post-MBO firm than take 
the price being offered. One way, but not the only way, for 
this to happen is if shareholders are forced out at a price which 
exceeds the prevailing market price but still falls short of the 
value of  expected future dividends under the pre-MBO op- 
erating strategy. 
The extent of coercion-whatever  the source of gains-is 
hard to gauge. In the substantial fraction of cases with com- 
peting bids, there is reason to believe that, as in any auction, 
much of the gain accrues to those selling. In these cases, there 
is little coercion. Even when a bidder other than management 
does not surface, management’s bid may have been set suf- 
ficiently high so as to deter the entry of competing bidders. 
Again, this would give most of  the gains to public shareholders. 
It is important to realize, however, that for an MBO to be 
profitable for its organizers, there must be some coercion- 
meaning that public  shareholders do not  capture all of  the 
gains. Otherwise, what’s in the deal for the organizers? While 
there is little real evidence on exactly how gains are shared 
between the organizers and public shareholders, there is some 
anecdotal evidence that managers do not volunteer to give up 
all of the gains. 
For example, when Mr. Stokely attempted to take Stokely- 
Van Camp private, he offered $50 for shares that were selling 
for $38 prior to his bid.  Eventually, however, the company 
was sold to Quaker Oats for $77, suggesting that perhaps Mr. 
Stokely had not offered all of the gains to his shareholders. 
In the same spirit, the management of Norton Simon originally 
offered $725 million for the company which fell far short of 
Esmark’s $1 billion winning bid.  In line with these stories, 
Lowenstein (1985) reports that average premia are 70 percent 
for successful MBOs in which three or more bidders are in- 
volved as compared to 50 percent for cases with fewer than 
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In addition there is strong evidence for the incumbent ad- 
vantage view, meaning that insiders have superior access to 
information as well as other strategic advantages in a takeover 
battle. Easy access to information is especially important in 
obtaining financing and ensuring profitable operation of the 
firm from the very beginning (which is a virtual necessity when 
the firm is highly leveraged). Other strategic advantages of the 
insiders include the ability to unilaterally lock up key assets 
(the crown jewels) with a friendly third party and having a 
much better chance of setting up an ESOP. 
While the incumbent’s advantage over other bidders some- 
what limits the extent of protection afforded old shareholders 
by the competitive bidding process, aspects of that advantage 
also make for superior value gains from a properly structured 
MBO as opposed to a hostile third-party takeover. 
Tax Gains 
Having said all this, we return to a discussion of the sources 
of value gains. The most commonly discussed source of gains 
in MBOs is value transferred from the taxman (Lowenstein 
1985), through deductibility of interest, step-up in asset basis 
for depreciation  purposes,  and the ESOP.  To  illustrate  the 
magnitude of  these potential  tax  savings,  we consider four 
well-publicized examples. 
Shareholders of  Congoleum, Inc., were bought out in 1980 
for $448 million, at a 50 percent premium over market. The 
estimated step-up in basis was $350 million against $26 million 
in recapture. Needless to say, tax savings were large. 
Norris Industries went through an MBO in  1981 for $420 
million, at a 48 percent premium. In the first year after the 
MBO, depreciation deductions increased to $33 million from 
$18 million a year earlier. Interest deductions increased to $62 
million from $1 million the year before. 
When management took Signode private in  1982 for $430 
million (29 percent above market value one day earlier), they 
wrote up assets from $150 million to $300 million, thus raising 
total annual write-offs from $20 million to $60 million. 
Dan River used  its ESOP to buy  70  percent of  the new 
company’s equity. According to Lowenstein (1983, $100 mil- 
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ascribed to various tax savings, the premature liquidation of 
pension plans, and other sources unrelated to the company’s 
operations. 
Underpricing of the Firm’s Equity 
While the evidence for the importance of tax gains is fairly 
abundant, the case for the importance of underpricing of the 
firm’s equity relative to fundamental value is much more ten- 
uous. First, it runs counter to the efficient markets hypothesis, 
which has been the bedrock of financial economics for many 
years. Recent critics of that hypothesis include Black (1986), 
who now calls the market “efficient”  as long as the price is 
within a factor of two of fundamental value. If financial mar- 
kets are highly efficient, the notions of the bear market of the 
late 1970s and of cheap stocks in basic industries are not very 
persuasive. Even if they are not efficient, the gains from MBOs 
are still bounded by the size of the informational inefficiency 
in the market. 
Weaker forms of the efficient markets hypothesis are con- 
sistent with managers having special information about their 
companies that enables them to know when their firms are 
underpriced even when the stock price is fully rational based 
on the market’s limited information. Although such informa- 
tional asymmetries would give  managers  an opportunity to 
buy undervalued  companies ifthey could buy secretly, it is 
important to recognize that management’s bid itself conveys 
a lot of information. Moreover, information is revealed when 
the MBO organizers try to obtain junk bond financing. In a 
competitive corporate control market, such information rev- 
elation severely handicaps the effort to profit  by  acquiring 
undervalued  firms.  Even absent competing bids,  the infor- 
mation released  after management’s  offer can raise the ac- 
quisition price enforced by the courts substantially above the 
prebid market price. 
A commonly argued version of the asymmetric information 
view states that managers distort pre-MBO earnings to make 
the  company  appear  unattractive,  thereby  enabling  them- 
selves to buy it for less. As a test of this view, Linda DeAngelo 
(1986) looked for abnormal earnings accruals prior to MBOs 
and found  no  evidence  of  significant  misrepresentation  of 
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It is very hard to say whether companies bought out by 
management are systematically underpriced. What we can say 
is that Value Line’s 1980 write-ups of the twelve firms in our 
Fortune 500 MBO sample suggested that the share prices of 
many of these firms contained substantial room for appreci- 
ation. For example, Value Line thought that eight of our twelve 
companies had very good long-run capital gains prospects and 
that three out of twelve had moderately good long-run pros- 
pects. At the same time, Value Line did not think that short- 
term prospects were good for any of  our companies. While 
the write-ups from Value Line hardly constitute strong evi- 
dence for irrational valuation by the market, they do suggest 
that these MBO targets  were valued  below their potential. 
Interpreted broadly enough, this observation may be hard to 
dispute, especially given the premia ultimately paid. 
Efficiency Gains 
Last but not  least, we turn to a discussion of  true value 
creation in MBOs, recognizing that the economic evaluation 
of  the MBO turns crucially  on the realization of  efficiency 
gains. Both tax savings and buying underpriced  shares from 
shareholders are examples of transfers of value between par- 
ties and not of true value creation. While such transfers change 
the distribution of the pie, they do not affect the size of the 
pie. The question of value creation is whether or not MBOs 
make the pie bigger. 
In discussing value creation, the first thing to note is that 
the ownership and financial structure in MBOs is heavily geared 
toward providing managers with incentives to squeeze addi- 
tional value out of the firm’s assets. Such motivating arrange- 
ments come in three forms. 
First, managers are given large equity stakes in their firms, 
which raise their personal benefit from improving efficiency. 
Lowenstein (1985) found in his sample of large MBOs that 
management’s percentage ownership rises from a median 3.8 
percent prior to the MBO to a median  10.4 percent after the 
transaction. The latter number is consistent with the finding 
of MBrck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) who, in a cross-section 
of  public  Fortune 500 firms, identified 5-10  percent as the 
range of management ownership associated with the best per- 
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centage  stakes to provide the right  incentives, but  not  big 
enough to confer complete control. 
In the vast majority of these cases, managers do not pay 
for these equity stakes out of their own pockets. In fact, they 
could not afford such investments in many instances. In most 
MBOs, managers are just given these large equity stakes for 
virtually no money. 
While equity stakes seem to be given to the managers with 
the intention of motivating them to work hard, there is always 
the stick in addition to the carrot. As stressed in the free-cash- 
flow theory of Jensen (1986), the necessity to meet debt pay- 
ments focuses the minds of managers on realizing the firm’s 
full potential, since default and renegotiation can cost them 
their independence and possibly their jobs. 
Last but not least, investment bankers usually also own a 
substantial amount of equity in the firm and are often capable 
of firing managers who are not performing as expected. It is 
conceivable that having an investment banker breathing down 
the manager’s neck is as good a motivating device as equity 
ownership. 
These last considerations may suggest why managers might 
not jump into MBOs without a hostile threat, despite the po- 
tential for large financial rewards.  After an MBO, managers 
lose much of their control over free cash flows as well as the 
ability to run their firms without outside interference, for at 
least a few years. While it is good to be rich, it is also good 
to be free. 
Granted that managers are motivated to improve operating 
efficiency, what can they actually accomplish? Although hard 
evidence is not abundant, belt-tightening measures typically 
seem to include the shortening of accounts receivable collec- 
tion periods, decreasing inventory-to-sales ratios, insisting on 
better deals from suppliers, cutting capital expenditures, and 
cutting employment.  (In a sample of  200  British  firms, for 
example, the average employment cut was  18 percent  sub- 
sequent to an LBO. This was not the result of management 
cuts, which were not very large. See Wright and Coyne 1985.) 
While some of these methods for increasing efficiency do not 
seem very revolutionary, it is important to realize that many 
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with low profit margins to start with. Small cost savings in 
these companies can add up to a vastly improved return on 
assets. 
Norris Industries is one case for which we have information 
about some of the belt-tightening measures. After the MBO, 
Norris liquidated $50 million in inventory and stabilized at half 
of its pre-MBO inventory-to-sales ratio. It also required cus- 
tomers to pay their bills in forty rather than fifty-five days. 
Finally,  Norris  sold a division for $34  million,  taking a $3 
million write-off. While these measures undoubtedly created 
some value, the Norris case is interesting in that something 
beyond  cost cutting was clearly going on. While the MBO 
transaction took place at approximately 1.6 times tangible book 
value, twenty-two months later Norris was reoffered to the 
public for approximately seven times book value. According 
to McGuire (1984), Norris is one of a group of companies going 
public in the hot new issues market of  1982-83  shortly after 
going private, whose huge successes were largely the result 
of  paper transmutations, in  other words,  value  transferred 
from old, and, particularly, new public shareholders. 
The example of Norris is suggestive in that, although value 
creation may not have been the initial impetus for the MBO, 
nontrivial efficiency gains were nonetheless realized.  Even 
when  tax  savings and the informational inefficiency  of  the 
market create the opportunities for large value transfers, the 
MBO deals that are ultimately struck are still structured so as 
to provide superior incentives for value creation. 
5.2.5  Effects of  Risk 
The existence of tax savings, underpricing, or the potential 
for efficiency gains are not the only important characteristics 
of  an MBO candidate. First, the increased financial risk in- 
curred by  the highly  leveraged post-MBO firm means that 
business risk should be low. A company operating in an un- 
stable environment in which its cash flows are subject to large 
fluctuations cannot take on 80-90  percent debt and still be 
fairly certain of meeting its regular payments. Furthermore, 
management’s obsession with the financial side, along with 
limited access to new financing, make growth and concentra- 
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quite difficult. If these areas are important sources of future 
profits,  an MBO may  be  ill advised. Consistent with these 
limitations, MBOs typically occur in mature industries with 
stable cash flows, such as food and textiles. Of course, the 
step-up in basis for depreciation purposes can also be more 
dramatic for older firms which, as cash cows, are also more 
likely to offer large value gains from restricting management’s 
access to free cash flows. 
The requirement of stable cash flows to meet debt payments 
also explains the necessity  of  retaining  the experienced in- 
cumbent management team, a strategy which is unlikely  to 
bring a big positive surprise but is equally unlikely to bring a 
big  negative  surprise. It is the latter factor that matters for 
debt payments.  The importance of the experience and con- 
tinuity of the management team in an MBO may also help to 
account for the great deals that managers strike when equity 
is divided up. 
While MBO organizers bear substantial risk, they also enjoy 
large upside potential. After the five to six years in which the 
debt is being repaid, the firm belongs to equity holders. Man- 
agement in this case would typically  own a 10-15  percent 
stake in a debt-free firm. If  efficiency gains are realized, cash 
flows are likely to exceed the amount needed to meet debt 
payments. In a company operating with a substantial amount 
of  slack prior to the buyout, these gains can be quite large. 
Finally, even if  things do not work out, it is probably easier 
for  a  private  company  with  substantial  investment banker 
ownership to renegotiate its debts. 
Many recent examples attest to the enormous gains to be 
made by organizers of leveraged buyouts. We  have already 
mentioned the Norris example, in which assets bought for 1.6 
times book were resold to the public for 7 times book value 
less than two years later.  Two other striking examples are 
Converse and Gibson Greeting Cards. While these were “le- 
veraged buyouts,” they could not strictly be called “manage- 
ment buyouts”  since both companies were purchased as di- 
visions of public companies (Allied and RCA, respectively). 
Yet the huge profits made (returns to organizers were 5 to 1 
in Converse and 200 to 1 in the Gibson case) were also likely 
to have  been  due in  part to value transferred from public 
shareholders. 101  Management Buyouts as a Response to Market Pressure 
Just as exogenous circumstances brought on the MBOs in 
the early 1980s, exogenous circumstances also blessed them 
two years later. The new issues market has been especially 
hot, enabling MBO organizers who bought assets in the bear 
market of the very early 1980s to do quite well. While there 
is good reason to believe that MBOs have done well in part 
because they encouraged efficiency and in part because of tax 
breaks, there was also clearly a large element of luck involved. 
5.3  Conclusion 
Whether or not management buyouts are a good thing de- 
pends on whom you ask. To the investment bankers who earned 
both high fees and 50-60  percent annualized returns on their 
equity positions, MBOs were a good thing. To the shareholders 
who got out of poorly performing firms at a 50 percent pre- 
mium, MBOs were probably a good thing, although they may 
have wished that they could have stayed on to receive a bigger 
portion of the tax and efficiency gains and, with the benefit 
of hindsight, to  profit from the enormous rally in the new issues 
market. MBOs were probably also a good thing for managers 
who traded a good deal of sweat for valuable equity positions, 
and perhaps more important, for the opportunity to escape a 
hostile takeover. To the banks, MBOs were probably also a 
good thing, in contrast to many of their other above prime 
loans. The principal  loser in  MBOs may  very well  be the 
taxman who definitely paid for at least some of the profits 
made by everybody else. 
Whether MBOs are a good thing from the economist’s per- 
spective  depends on whether they  promote economic effi- 
ciency. While it is likely that much of the premium and the 
impetus behind MBOs came from the existence of value trans- 
fer gains, the end result was clearly a nontrivial  amount of 
value creation. The enterprises emerging from MBOs are in- 
variably structured to give managers greater incentives to cut 
costs and to budget capital more responsibly. Increased man- 
agement ownership, concentrated ownership in the hands of 
knowledgeable profit-motivated  investment bankers, and re- 
duced free cash flows all contribute to the value created in 
MBOs. Finally, managers who know their firms best get to 
keep them, and all of the upheaval costs associated with hostile 102  Andrei ShleifedRobert W.  Vishny 
takeovers are avoided. While there is no doubt that issues of 
fairness to various parties loom large in any view of manage- 
ment buyouts, from the point of view of promoting efficiency 
they appear to be a good thing. 
Note 
We  would like to thank James Hines and Steve Kaplan for very helpful 
discussions  and the National Bureau of  Economic Research for research 
support. 
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